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PROACTIVE SAFETY REQUIRES PROACTIVE MEASUREMENT
Alyssa Mitchell Gibbons
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Champaign, Illinois
Terry L. von Thaden
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Champaign, Illinois
A major challenge for organizations and safety researchers alike is that commonly used measures of safety (e.g.,
accident/incident rates, safety behavior) support a reactive rather than a proactive approach to safety. We argue that
Reason’s (1990) widely-accepted model of the causes of error suggests a more useful place to focus measurement
attempts: preconditions for unsafe acts. Measuring and investigating preconditions rather than errors or outcomes
facilitates a proactive, preventive focus; furthers theory development regarding the role of organizational factors in
safety; and offers potential remedies to measurement challenges in safety research.
employee (Zohar & Luria, 2003), and that identifying
systemic problems can allow them to be corrected
before they become safety events (von Thaden,
Wiegmann, & Shappell, 2006; Patankar et al., 2005).
Thus, a systems approach to safety is intended to be a
proactive approach.

Introduction
Since the early days of aviation, understanding and
improving safety has been, on the whole, a reactive
endeavor (Maurino, Reason, Johnston, & Lee, 1995).
After an accident or incident occurred, authorities
pinpointed the error(s) that most directly caused the
event and identified the individual(s) responsible.
These “responsible” individuals would receive some
type of disciplinary action and other individuals in the
organization would be cautioned to prevent the error
from occurring again. While this approach was not
without results, it left a great deal to be desired, as this
piecemeal approach did little to correct systemic
hazards or anticipate errors before an event occurred.

A number of obstacles remain, however, before this
approach can fulfill its proactive promise. Prominent
among these obstacles is the need for an appropriate
criterion measure. How do we know whether an
airline is safe? And how can we determine whether
an airline’s safety level is improving or has
improved? Truly proactive safety requires a means to
monitor safety actively over time, to account for
system-wide effects and influences on safety, and to
identify potential hazardous states before they result
in an event such as an accident. In the paragraphs that
follow, we briefly discuss the deficiencies of
traditional safety criteria from the standpoint of
proactive safety. We then present arguments, based
on Reason’s (1990) model of accident causation, for
shifting the point of measurement from active failures
to the latent preconditions for unsafe acts. We
consider how this change in emphasis may be helpful
for both understanding and prevention of accidents
and make recommendations for future research.

In more recent years, regulatory agencies, airlines
and safety researchers have recognized that safety is
indeed systemic and research should adopt a focus on
a systems approach to safety (e.g. Leveson, 2004;
Maurino, 2000; Johnston, et. al, 1997; Reason, 1995;
Perrow, 1986). Littlejohn (1983) defines a system as,
"a set of objects or entities that interrelate with one
another to form a whole." (p. 29). A system can be
either a closed system or an open system. Our focus
is on open systems, i.e. social systems, which
incorporate exchanges with their environment. A
rapidly growing body of research has begun to
examine the role of the system through
organizational-level factors, such as safety culture
(Wiegmann et al., 2004), in facilitating or preventing
accidents. When accidents or incidents are traced
through the causal chain of events to the top levels of
the organization, the specific error committed by an
individual employee typically represents only a
fraction of the problem (von Thaden, Wiegmann, &
Shappell, 2006). This research implies that changes
made at the organizational level can profoundly
improve safety at the level of the individual

Traditional Safety Criteria
Accident and Incident Rates
The ultimate safety goal of any organization is to avoid
loss due to accidents and incidents. Accident rates,
therefore, appear to be a natural, salient metric for
evaluating safety. In aviation, however, accident rates
tell us remarkably little about an airline’s true safety
level. Aviation accidents are thankfully infrequent, so
large amounts of data and lengthy time intervals are
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Accident/incident rates cannot tell us whether safety
measures have been successful in preventing events
that might have occurred. Measures of employees’
safety behavior cannot tell us the complete story
about the context in which that behavior occurs.
Where then should we focus our attention? A
measure is needed to account for both the unsafe
conditions that have not yet resulted in an accident
and the factors beyond the immediate control of the
individual employee.

needed before accident rates are even interpretable.
This means that an airline that conducts a safety
intervention must literally wait a year or more to see
improvement, and any such improvement is likely to
be small. Further, if causes of accidents are often
related to latent factors (Reason, 1995), an accident
rate measured at one point provides little information
about accidents that may be waiting to happen.
It has long been known that incidents (or “events”)
occur substantially more frequently than accidents
(e.g. Heinrich, 1950; Simonds & Grimaldi, 1956),
and so some studies have begun incorporating
incident rates into their measures of safety
(Zacharatos, Barling, & Iverson, 2005). However,
incident rates are strongly confounded with reporting
issues. Incident underreporting is widespread and
substantial, even when reporting is mandated by law
(Probst, Brubaker, & Barsotti, 2006). Employees
often have conflicting incentives with regard to
reporting, or simply may not have access or time to
report, and it is not clear whether a high reporting
rate reflects a poor level of safety or a strong safety
culture in which the reporting of even minor
incidents is encouraged (cf. Reason 1997, 1998).

We argue that measures for proactive organizational
safety should focus on the prevalence of
preconditions for unsafe acts (Reason, 1990,
Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000) as the primary
outcome of interest. These preconditions are factors
that affect the likelihood of committing an unsafe act.
Reason proposed that organizational factors (safety
culture, resource limitations, desire to avoid delays,
etc.) create these preconditions (time pressure, etc.),
which then increase the likelihood of errors or
violations of safety procedures. These errors or
violations then lead to safety outcomes such as
accidents or incidents. Empirical links have been
demonstrated between the presence of preconditions
and errors/violations and between errors/violations
and outcomes (Hobbs & Williamson, 2003).
Therefore,
Reason’s
model
suggests
that
interventions that reduce the preconditions should
also reduce the incidence of errors and the overall
accident/incident rate.

Safety Behavior
Some have sought to overcome the problems
associated with accident/incident rates by focusing on
employees’ safety behavior as the outcome of interest
(Fogarty, 2004, 2005). This may be appropriate for
jobs in which individuals work alone or in work
where tasks are not interdependent (cf. Wallace &
Chen, 2006), or for industries in which the primary
concern is prevention of occupational injuries to
employees (cf. Barling & Frone, 2004). However, as
noted earlier, for safety in complex industries, such
as aviation, increasingly understood as systemic, the
consequences of safety behavior extend far beyond
the individual. As a result, assessing individuals’
safety behavior provides only part of the overall
picture. If one member of a team acts unsafely, the
complex interdependencies of this behavior may put
the safety of the entire flight at risk. Further, if
procedures are flawed, if equipment is faulty, or if
communication gaps exist between team members,
safe behavior on the part of individuals may not be
sufficient to ensure safety.

In Reason’s model, preconditions for unsafe acts are
the mechanism by which organizational factors, such
as safety culture, are expected to influence safety
outcomes. However, this aspect of the model has not
often been considered in a proactive way. Research
abounds regarding errors and violations, and research
regarding organizational factors is rapidly growing.
Additionally, many studies have shown empirical
links between the two ends of the model:
organizational factors and safety outcomes (e.g.,
Hofmann & Stetzer, 1998; Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin,
2003; Zohar, 1980). Although some studies do follow
Reason’s model in its entirety and “connect the dots”
across all elements, these studies are typically
retrospective and aimed at identifying the causes of
accidents that have already happened (e.g., Hobbs &
Williamson, 2003; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001). It
bears noting that information resulting from complete
studies such as these is a rich source of empirical
trend data that provide a basis to inform change.
Commonly these studies stand as the proven
approach for researchers to inform safety
improvement. Our lament is that as safety
researchers, necessity or availability of information

Taking a Proactive Approach
As discussed above, proactive safety requires
addressing systemic safety issues before they become
safety events (Patankar et al., 2005). In this light, the
criteria
discussed
above
are
deficient.
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place only after a specific error has occurred and to
address only that particular error. An intervention
targeted at a precondition for error, however, can
address the several types of errors that follow from
the associated precondition: both those errors that
have already occurred and those that have the
probability to occur.

often times forces us to focus on accident case studies
to make the case for safety based on transpired loss.
We propose that focusing more attention on how
preconditions for unsafe acts mediate the relationship
between organizational factors and safety outcomes
is useful for solving a number of theoretical and
practical problems in the field of safety research, and
in aviation safety in particular. Measuring safety
preconditions and considering them as indicators of
an airline’s safety level can:
(1) increase our ability to prevent errors before
they occur;
(2) provide a useful framework for theory
development; and
(3) address at least some of the measurement
challenges currently associated with safety
research.

A concrete example is likely to be helpful here. The
most frequent type of maintenance error found by
Hobbs & Williamson (2003) was a lapse in memory,
such as forgetting to retrieve tools or materials from
an aircraft or forgetting to perform a preliminary
check. Hobbs and Williamson found that such lapses
were most strongly associated with the contributing
factor (or precondition) of time pressure. Consider an
organization that experiences a significant incident as
a result of the first type of memory lapse: a
technician failed to remove a screwdriver from an
engine compartment after performing routine
maintenance, which led to substantial engine damage
and a flight delay. In a reactive approach to safety,
the organization might issue memos, post signs, or
alter checklists to remind technicians to make sure all
tools have been returned to their proper places before
closing the compartment. This approach addresses
the specific error that was committed, but does not
address other types of memory lapses (similar errors)
that might occur and leaves the precondition (time
pressure) for such lapses intact. By contrast, targeting
the precondition by scheduling additional staff or
automating procedures represents a proactive
approach. Such interventions should reduce the
likelihood not only of the initial error, but also of
other similar errors – even those that have never
occurred before but have the potential to occur.
Further, ongoing measurement and monitoring of
preconditions can help an organization identify likely
risk areas and address reducing the impact of hazards
from these areas before any error occurs.

Preventing New Errors Before They Occur
Reason’s model is often conceptualized using a
“Swiss cheese” metaphor, in which the different
elements of the model are pictured as layers of
cheese, with “holes” that may or may not align
(Reason, 1990). The model can also be viewed as a
branching or logic tree system, in which an element
at one level of the model corresponds to several
elements at the next level (see Figure 1).

Error
Precondition

Error
Error

Organizational
Factor

Error
Precondition

Error
Error

Figure 1. Visualization of Reason’s (1990) model as
a logic tree system.

Furthering Theoretical Understanding
In the safety culture literature (and that of its close
cousin, safety climate), there are many competing
theories regarding how, exactly, organizational factors
lead to safety outcomes. A wide variety of mediating
mechanisms have been proposed, ranging from
employees’ safety knowledge & motivation (Griffin &
Neal, 2000) to their physical health and strain
(Fogarty, 2004) to their regulatory focus (Wallace &
Chen, 2006). Each of these hypotheses has received
empirical support. Reason’s model can be viewed as a
competitor to these models, but we contend that it may
also be viewed as a framework that can encompass
most if not all proposed mediators.

A single organizational factor, such as safety culture,
may influence many preconditions, and each
precondition may affect the likelihood of several
different types of errors. Empirical evidence supports
this conceptualization; Hobbs & Williamson (2003)
were able to link 619 reported maintenance errors
with a taxonomy of ten error-producing conditions.
This suggests that an approach to safety focusing on
preconditions can be both more proactive and more
general than an error-focused approach. When errors
are the unit of interest, interventions are likely to take
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Though Reason (1990) did not initially propose a
comprehensive taxonomy of preconditions, several
such taxonomies have been developed. Among the
most well known is the Human Factors Analysis and
Classification System (HFACS; Shappell &
Wiegmann, 2000). Many of the mediators of safety
culture proposed in other research fit nicely into the
HFACS framework. For example, employees’ physical
health (Fogarty, 2004) corresponds to the HFACS
category of “adverse physiological states,” while
regulatory focus (Wallace & Chen, 2006) might be
considered an “adverse mental state.” Lack of safety
knowledge (Griffin & Neal, 2000) could be viewed as
a “physical/mental limitation.” In other words, it seems
that many if not all of the factors proposed as
mediators of organizational factors may fit into the
taxonomies of preconditions originally developed from
Reason’s model. Reason’s model therefore provides an
overarching explanation of how these proposed
mediators may function simultaneously; rather than in
competition with one another.

performance. Some preconditions are relatively
objective and could be assessed by independent
observers, bypassing the self-report issue altogether.
For example, well-trained observers or auditors could
easily evaluate preconditions such as the work
environment, equipment, and procedures.

Improving Measurement

First, psychometrically sound measures of
preconditions must be developed. As mentioned
previously, much of the research that considers
preconditions is retrospective. While it is clear that
preconditions relating to a particular error can be
identified after the fact (e.g., Hobbs & Williamson,
2003), what is needed is a means by which all
preconditions operating within an airline at a given
time can be assessed simultaneously. To our
knowledge, this has not been attempted. We noted
above that a well-trained observer could reasonably
evaluate several preconditions, such as equipment or
procedures. Others (such as supervision, etc.) may
require surveys or other more participatory methods.
Establishing quality measures will require careful
consideration of level of measurement issues. Some
preconditions, such as pressure, clearly affect the
workgroup as a whole, and should be assessed at the
group level. Others, such as the physiological and
psychological categories, are concerned with the
individual employee. It may still be desirable to
aggregate these preconditions to the group level, but
such aggregation must take the variance among group
members, as well as the group mean, into account.

Research Agenda
Reason’s (1990) model has been highly influential in
aviation safety research, but it has not yet lived up to
its full potential in terms of promoting a proactive
systems approach to safety. Focusing attention on the
level of preconditions for unsafe acts, rather than on
the unsafe acts themselves, offers considerable
promise for facilitating such an approach. However, a
great deal of research is needed to translate this
promise from the theoretical into the practical. We
therefore offer a brief preliminary agenda for
researchers interested in exploring the role of
preconditions in proactive aviation safety.

Using the prevalence of preconditions for unsafe acts
as an index of safety may also help researchers and
airlines circumvent some of the measurement
problems associated with other safety criteria. The
degree to which each precondition is present within a
particular airline (or location, or shift) can be
measured on a continuous scale, unlike accident or
incident rates, which require counts of infrequent
events. It is meaningful to consider the prevalence of
preconditions over much smaller units of time – a
month, a quarter, or a busy holiday season –
compared to the year or 100,000 flight hours used to
calculate accident rates. This makes it possible to
monitor safety on a more continuous basis and to
notice changes or fluctuations in safety conditions
more rapidly.
Further, because preconditions are somewhat
removed from specific errors, reporting preconditions
is expected to be less personal (and therefore less
problematic) than reporting either incidents or safety
performance. While some of the common
preconditions identified by Hobbs & Williamson
(2003), such as physiological limitations or fatigue,
apply largely to individuals, most target group or
organizational level issues (e.g., pressure, training,
supervision) and do not require individuals to
“incriminate” themselves or their colleagues. Some
social desirability and self-presentation effects are
likely to remain; however, we expect that such effects
will be substantially less for measures of
preconditions than for measures of personal safety

Further, measures of safety preconditions must show
discriminant validity with measures of organizational
factors and individual factors such as safety values. It
is unfortunate that much of the existing research
assesses all three elements of the model under
consideration (e.g., safety culture, mediating
processes, and errors) in a single self-report
questionnaire administered at one point in time (e.g.,
Fogarty, 2004; 2005). True causal inferences cannot
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dilemma: shift the measurement focus from after-thefact measures such as errors or safety outcomes to the
preconditions for unsafe acts, which occur prior to
error. In the present paper, we have argued that
devoting more attention to measuring and evaluating
safety preconditions can greatly enhance our ability
to promote proactive safety and understand the
mechanisms underlying safety in organizations.
Though such an approach presents numerous
research challenges, the opportunity to move beyond
the traditional reactive approach to active prevention
is well worth the effort.

be drawn from such studies, and the possibility that
method bias inflates the observed relationships is
strong.
Effective
measurement
of
safety
preconditions requires that they be clearly
distinguished from measures of related variables: in
method, in time, and ideally in source (i.e., all
information should not come from a single sample of
employees).
As good measures of preconditions are developed, it
should become possible and desirable to establish
forward-looking
predictive
links
between
preconditions and errors. Laboratory research may
prove fruitful here in that a controlled lab study can
demonstrate a clear causal link between the presence
or absence of a precondition and categories of error.
Such research can then be translated into field studies
of controlled interventions, targeting a particular
precondition and examining the subsequent incidence
of related errors or improved operational conditions.
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